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WON’T GET FOOLED AGAIN: WHY VW’S 
EMISSIONS DECEPTION IS ILLEGAL IN 
EUROPE AND HOW TO IMPROVE THE  
EU’S AUTO REGULATORY SYSTEM 
KEVIN TARSA* 
Abstract: Replete with greed, hubris, and deceit, the Volkswagen emissions 
scandal is not your typical case of corporate wrongdoing. With a price tag of $20 
million in the United States, it is already one of the most expensive corporate 
scandals in history and has caused significant damage to the environment, public 
health, and the global economy. Dieselgate has had a majorly disproportionate 
impact on Europe, where nearly nine million of the eleven million affected cars 
are located. The financial cost of the scandal, however, has been confined almost 
entirely to the United States, due to a European Union (EU) regulation that al-
lows automakers to change their cars’ performance settings before emissions 
tests. This Note argues that this regulation, though considered a loophole by 
some, is not an escape hatch for European car manufacturers. Thus, it argues that 
Volkswagen’s use of defeat-device software violates EU law. With an eye toward 
preventing similar scandals in the future, it also recommends ways in which the 
EU can improve its auto regulatory system, and identifies the costs of allowing 
Volkswagen’s misconduct to go unpunished in Europe.  
INTRODUCTION 
In a 2011 meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, British auto regulators noticed 
an apparent loophole in European Union (EU) emissions test regulations that 
allowed car manufacturers to alter engine performance settings before pollu-
tion tests.1 The regulators warned that leaving the loophole in place could evis-
cerate vehicle emissions tests because it allowed carmakers to select a special 
setting usually not used on the roads.2 To fix this problem, British regulators 
proposed that emissions tests be performed on the default setting or the setting 
that produced the most pollution.3 Although most of the national regulators 
                                                                                                                           
 * Kevin Tarsa is the Executive Articles Editor for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
 1 Danny Hakim & Claire Barthelemy, VW’s Emissions-Test Trickery May Not Be Illegal in Eu-
rope, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/business/international/vw-
scandal-eu-emissions-tests.html [https://perma.cc/585G-Z7WQ]. 
 2 See id. 
 3 See id. 
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initially supported the proposal, they dropped it from their agenda by 2014.4 
Consequently, the loophole was left in place.5 
About a year later, in September 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) accused Volkswagen (VW) of cheating emissions tests with 
“defeat device” software in about half a million U.S. cars.6 Around eleven mil-
lion diesel vehicles worldwide contain the software.7 The software turned on 
emissions controls during government tests but deactivated the controls during 
regular driving, increasing emissions as high as nearly forty times the permit-
ted levels of nitrogen oxides (NOx).
8 These high emissions levels may pose a 
grave threat to the environment and public health, particularly in Europe.9 
They have exacerbated Europe’s preexisting pollution problem, which has led 
some European cities to institute low-emissions zones and temporary bans on 
cars.10 
As a result of the scandal—or “Dieselgate,” as it has come to be known—
VW reported its first quarterly loss in fifteen years, and its value sank.11 Its 
chief executive officer stepped down, and the company suspended several of 
its executives.12 In March 2016, Michael Horn, head of VW’s U.S. operations, 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See id. 
 5 See id. 
 6 Coral Davenport & Jack Ewing, VW Is Said to Cheat on Diesel Emissions; U.S. to Order Big 
Recall, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/19/business/volkswagen-is-
ordered-to-recall-nearly-500000-vehicles-over-emissions-software.html [https://perma.cc/J8KM-
3PHH]; Andy Sharman & Robert Wright, VW Cheated Emissions Tests, Says EPA, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 
18, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/5e0b8bcc-5e21-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2 [https://perma.cc/
A3RB-PWB4]. 
 7 Jack Ewing, Volkswagen Says 11 Million Cars Worldwide Are Affected in Diesel Deception, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/business/international/volkswagen-
diesel-car-scandal.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5KBX-FJDA]. 
 8 See Guilbert Gates et al., How Volkswagen’s ‘Defeat Devices’ Worked, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2017), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-
explained.html [https://perma.cc/Z4GC-XNAN]. 
 9 See Noelle Eckley Selin, One of the Biggest Consequences of the Volkswagen Diesel Scandal, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 30, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/30/volkswagen-diesel-scandal-consequences/ 
[https://perma.cc/9Z2W-EPX]; Shannon Hall, VW Scandal Causes Small but Irreversible Environ-
mental Damage, SCI. AM. (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/vw-scandal-
causes-small-but-irreversible-environmental-damage/ [https://perma.cc/Q7QA-KML4]. 
 10 See Charles W. Schmidt, Beyond a One-Time Scandal: Europe’s Ongoing Diesel Pollution 
Problem, 124 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS. A19, A22 (2016); Kim Willsher, Paris’s First Attempt at Car-
Free Day Brings Big Drop in Air and Noise Pollution, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2015, 3:16 PM), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/03/pariss-first-attempt-at-car-free-day-brings-big-drop-in-air-
and-noise-pollution [https://perma.cc/BJR8-9QR8]; Hall, supra note 9. 
 11 Jack Ewing, Volkswagen, Hit by Emissions Scandal, Posts Its First Loss in Years, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/business/international/volkswagen-earnings-
q3.html [https://perma.cc/LS8X-J2FN]; Gates et al., supra note 8. 
 12 Jack Ewing, Volkswagen C.E.O. Martin Winterkorn Resigns Amid Emissions Scandal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24/business/international/volkswagen-
chief-martin-winterkorn-resigns-amid-emissions-scandal.html [https://perma.cc/LPX5-UWJF]; Jack 
Ewing, Volkswagen Suspends 5th Executive in Emissions Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015), 
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suddenly resigned.13 That October, VW agreed to spend $10 billion to buy 
back or fix the affected cars in the United States.14 And in January 2017, VW 
pleaded guilty to three criminal felony counts—conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud and to violate the Clean Air Act, customs violations, and obstruction of 
justice.15 The carmaker will pay $4.3 billion in criminal and civil penalties to 
settle the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) inquiry, increasing the total cost 
of the scandal in the United States to $20 billion.16 Dieselgate is already one of 
the most expensive cases of corporate misconduct ever, overshadowing Toyo-
ta’s $1.2 billion settlement for faulty accelerators and General Motor’s $900 
million settlement for defective ignition switches.17 To make matters worse for 
the company, the DOJ recently charged six VW executives, including individ-
uals who were in charge of engine development, quality control, and regulato-
ry affairs.18 None of the executives sit on VW’s board, but U.S. prosecutors 
have shown a willingness to indict others if additional evidence is uncovered.19 
Meanwhile, in Europe, where nearly nine million of the eleven million il-
legal cars were sold, consumers still have not been compensated.20 VW is de-
fying calls by the European Commission and EU politicians to buy back the 
rigged cars, which it did in the United States.21 A London court is set to hear a 
                                                                                                                           
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/business/volkswagen-suspends-5th-executive-in-emissions-
scandal.html [https://perma.cc/9H5M-49CF]. 
 13 Jad Mouawad, Head of VW’s U.S. Unit Is Out, and Dealers Are Alarmed, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/business/international/volkswagen-us-chief-michael-
horn-leaves-the-company.html [https://perma.cc/K4UW-J6J4]. 
 14 Neal E. Boudette, Relief at Last for U.S. Owners of Diesel Volkswagens, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/business/relief-at-last-for-us-owners-of-diesel-volkswagens.
html [https://perma.cc/B2AR-HC7D]. 
 15 Hiroko Tabuchi et al., 6 Volkswagen Executives Charged as Company Pleads Guilty in Emis-
sions Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/business/volkswagen-
diesel-vw-settlement-charges-criminal.html [https://perma.cc/S6YB-5XRS]. 
 16 Id. The $4.3 billion penalty is in addition to the $14.7 billion Volkswagen (VW) paid in July 
2016 to settle consumers’ class actions. Jeffrey Rothfeder, At Volkswagen, a Scandal Where Execu-
tives Could Pay the Price, NEW YORKER (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/business/
currency/at-volkswagen-a-scandal-where-executives-could-pay-the-price [https://perma.cc/5YEQ-
XAZ4]. 
 17 Rothfeder, supra note 16; Tabuchi et al., supra note 15. 
 18 Rothfeder, supra, note 16. One of those individuals, Oliver Schmidt, was arrested in Florida, 
but the five others are thought to be in Germany. Tabuchi, supra note 15. Because Germany usually 
does not extradite its citizens, they may never appear in U.S. court, but the U.S. charges will impair 
their ability to travel. Id. 
 19 Rothfeder, supra note 16. Although the charges against the top managers are a notable shift in 
the Department of Justice’s commitment to holding top executives accountable, the lack of accusa-
tions against board members could shield the company from derivative suits brought by shareholders. 
Tabuchi, supra note 15. German investigators, however, plan to interview Martin Winterkorn, VW’s 
former CEO, who immediately stepped down. Rothfeder, supra, note 16. 
 20 Patrick McGee, VW Car Owners in EU Face Hard Quest for Compensation Over Scandal, FIN. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/0b9bf1d2-e486-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a [https://
perma.cc/YPW3-9WAX]. 
 21 Id. 
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case in 2017 brought on behalf of more than twenty thousand British VW 
owners seeking £3000 each, meaning the automaker could face a bill of £3.6 
billion.22 Consumers in Germany, the EU nation with the most cars affected by 
the scandal (2.4 million), face an even tougher legal battle, as German law 
does not permit class action lawsuits.23 Because German consumers must sue 
VW individually and the company has been appealing every case it loses, there 
is little incentive to sue.24 The EU Commission has threatened to sue seven 
European nations, including Germany and the United Kingdom, for failing to 
penalize car manufacturers for cheating on pollution tests.25 
Despite VW’s admission that it fooled emissions tests in the United 
States, it remains unclear whether the carmaker’s engine-altering software vio-
lates EU law.26 VW’s board of directors maintain that its software is not an 
illegal defeat device under European regulations.27 Shocking though this may 
seem, the regulation that European regulators left in place may let VW off the 
hook.28 It provides: “the settings of the engine and of the vehicle’s controls 
shall be those prescribed by the manufacturer.”29 Although the use of defeat 
devices is banned in Europe, if carmakers such as VW may determine their 
own engine settings during emissions tests, using software to alter engine set-
tings may not violate European regulations.30 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I details the VW scandal, the flaws 
in the EU’s auto regulatory system, and emissions testing in the United States. 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See id.; Rob Davies, Dieselgate: UK Motorists File Class-Action Suit Against VW, GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 9, 2017, 7:21 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/09/dieselgate-volkswagen-
uk-motorists-class-action-suit [https://perma.cc/MA8R-P98A]. The court held a preliminary hearing 
in the case in late January, 2017. Davies, supra. 
 23 See McGee, supra note 20. 
 24 See id. 
 25 See Ewa Krukowska & Stephanie Bodoni, VW Dieselgate Scandal Triggers Legal Clash Be-
tween EU, Germany, BLOOMBERG MARKETS (Dec. 8, 2016, 10:19 AM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2016-12-08/germany-u-k-risk-eu-court-fight-in-wake-of-volkswagen-scandal 
[https://perma.cc/RXE6-QCAP]. The other nations are the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Greece, Lux-
embourg, and Spain. Id. 
 26 See Danny Hakim, VW Admits Cheating in the U.S., but Not in Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/business/international/vw-admits-cheating-in-the-us-but-
not-in-europe.html [https://perma.cc/6TJD-TGAX]; Hakim & Barthelemy, supra note 1. 
 27 See Hakim, supra note 26. The board’s determination contradicts both European and U.S. regu-
latory findings. Id. In December 2015, German regulators said that VW used a forbidden defeat de-
vice. Id. 
 28 See Hakim & Barthelemy, supra note 1. 
 29 Regulation No 83 of the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations (UNECE)—
Uniform Provisions Concerning the Approval of Vehicles with Regard to the Emission of Pollutants 
According to Engine Fuel Requirements, 2015 O.J. (L 172) 1, 80 (EU) [hereinafter Regulation No 
83]; see also Hakim & Barthelemy, supra note 1. 
 30 See Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 
2007 on Type Approval of Motor Vehicles with Respect to Emissions from Light Passenger and 
Commercial Vehicles (Euro 5 and Euro 6) and on Access to Vehicle Repair and Maintenance Infor-
mation, 2007 O.J. (L 171) 1, 6; Hakim & Barthelemy, supra note 1. 
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Part II discusses the EU regulations at issue for VW, Europe’s diesel pollution 
problem, the U.S. vehicle certification process, and the U.S. treatment of de-
feat devices. Part III argues that VW’s emissions-test trickery is illegal under 
EU law despite an apparent inconsistency in European rules. Furthermore, it 
analyzes the consequences of deeming VW’s cheating legal in Europe, and 
recommends ways to improve the EU’s auto regulatory system. 
BACKGROUND 
A. Volkswagen Cons the World 
Carmakers have long struggled to sell diesel cars in the United States be-
cause of their association with dirty, smoky engines.31 That one of diesel’s 
most appealing features, fuel economy, tends to be less important to Americans 
than to Europeans has made a hard sell even harder.32 To make its diesel cars 
more attractive to American consumers, VW in 2008 heralded a “new era of 
diesel,” featuring what it claimed to be its cleanest engines yet.33 The clean 
diesel campaign was a core part of an ambitious growth strategy initiated by 
then-C.E.O., Martin Winterkorn, to catapult VW past General Motors and 
Toyota as the global leader in auto sales by 2018.34 Consumers had assumed 
that making diesel cleaner necessarily meant decreasing a car’s fuel economy 
or performance.35 But with its new cars, VW promised customers the best of 
both worlds: outstanding fuel economy and performance, as well as lower 
emissions.36 As the fallout from the scandal has shown, VW’s promise was in 
fact too good to be true.37 
On October 8, 2015, Michael Horn, VW Group of America President and 
C.E.O., testified before members of Congress on the German carmaker’s in-
stallation of software in its diesel cars to trick emissions tests.38 Horn apolo-
gized on behalf of VW, the world’s top carmaker by sales for the first half of 
2015, for using software in eleven million cars “that served to defeat the regu-
                                                                                                                           
 31 See James Surowiecki, The Environmental Legacy of the Volkswagen Scandal, NEW YORKER 
(Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-environmental-legacy-of-the-
volkswagen-scandal [https://perma.cc/8CZ5-VDJB]; see also Adam Aston, This Is Not Your Father’s 
Diesel, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/
stories/2008-04-09/this-is-not-your-fathers-diesel [https://perma.cc/6GN8-C48F]. 
 32 See Surowiecki, supra note 31. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See Rothfeder, supra note 16. 
 35 See Surowiecki, supra note 31. 
 36 See id. BMW and Mercedes made comparable claims about their clean diesel cars, but neither 
is embroiled in an emissions scandal. See id. 
 37 See id. 
 38 Bill Chappell, ‘It Was Installed for This Purpose,’ VW’s U.S. CEO Tells Congress About De-
feat Device, NPR (Oct. 8, 2015, 10:17 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/10/08/
446861855/volkswagen-u-s-ceo-faces-questions-on-capitol-hill [https://perma.cc/HTR7-QC5F]. 
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lar emissions testing regime.”39 That same day, German prosecutors raided 
VW’s headquarters in Wolfsburg to seize documents and records that reflected 
the company’s emissions cheating.40 
Dieselgate originated from a study conducted by a small research team at 
West Virginia University between late 2012 and May 2013.41 The International 
Council on Clean Transportation, which provides independent research to gov-
ernment entities that regulate the environment, commissioned the team to test 
diesel cars that VW marketed as eco-friendly and fuel-efficient.42 The group 
discovered that the VW Passat and the VW Jetta had on-road diesel emissions 
levels that were drastically higher than what U.S. regulators normally saw in 
tests.43 After repeatedly verifying its procedures, the group turned over its data 
to the EPA and the California Air Resources Board.44 
On September 18, 2015, the EPA issued a notice of violation to 
Volkswagen AG, Audi AG, and Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. alleging 
that approximately half a million diesel vehicles sold in the United States since 
2008 included software that sidestepped EPA emissions regulations.45 The no-
tice stated that certain VW vehicles used “a sophisticated software algorithm” 
that “detects when the car is undergoing official emissions testing, and turns 
full emissions controls on only during the test.”46 During normal driving con-
                                                                                                                           
 39 See id.; Virginia Harrison, Move Over Toyota! Volkswagen Winning Global Sales Race, CNN 
MONEY (July 28, 2015, 7:36 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/28/investing/volkswagen-toyota-
biggest-carmaker/ [https://perma.cc/8ZJM-MN5K]. 
 40 Chappell, supra note 38. 
 41 See David Morgan, West Virginia Engineer Proves to Be a David to VW’s Goliath, REUTERS 
(Sept. 23, 2015, 9:11 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-volkswagen-researchers-idUS
KCN0RM2D720150924 [https://perma.cc/BR2Y-PPCE]; see also Sonari Glinton, How a Little Lab in 
West Virginia Caught Volkswagen’s Big Cheat, NPR (Sep. 24, 2015, 5:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2015/09/24/443053672/how-a-little-lab-in-west-virginia-caught-volkswagens-big-cheat [https://
perma.cc/Q5FH-D3A7]. 
 42 Glinton, supra note 41. 
 43 See Morgan, supra note 41. Daniel Cardner, the engineer who led the study, said of the results: 
“(We) saw huge discrepancies. There was one vehicle with 15 to 35 times the emissions levels and 
another vehicle with 10 to 20 the emissions levels.” Id. (alteration in original). 
 44 See Glinton, supra note 41. 
 45 EPA, California Notify Volkswagen of Clean Air Act Violations/Carmaker Allegedly Used 
Software That Circumvents Emissions Testing for Certain Air Pollutants, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-california-notify-volkswagen-clean-
air-act-violations-carmaker-allegedly-used [https://perma.cc/WGS2-VES7] [hereinafter VW Notice of 
Violation, September 2015]. A notice of violation is the first step in the agency’s enforcement pro-
cess. Enforcement and Compliance History Online, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, https://echo.epa.gov/resources/general-info/echo-faq [https://perma.cc/M37P-KA4K]. It 
indicates that the agency believes the recipient of the notice is in violation of the law. Id. It does not 
constitute a final, legal determination that a violation has taken place. Id. 
 46 VW Notice of Violation, September 2015, supra note 45. According to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the software could sense that a test was taking place based on “speed, en-
gine operation, air pressure and even the position of the steering wheel.” Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: 
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ditions, the effectiveness of the cars’ emissions controls were substantially re-
duced.47 Thus the cars met emissions standards when tested but emitted NOx at 
up to forty times the legal cap when driven normally.48 VW’s software there-
fore constituted a “defeat device” according to the CAA.49 
The VW scandal began in the United States but soon spawned an interna-
tional investigation.50 On September 22, 2015, VW revealed that eleven million 
of its diesel cars contained software that could cheat emissions tests.51 Almost 
nine million of these cars are in Europe, including the Audi A3 and the VW Jetta, 
Beetle, Golf, and Passat.52 In response, the UK, Italy, France, South Korea, and 
Germany began investigations.53 Although VW said it would recall 8.5 million 
cars in Europe, including 2.4 million in Germany and 1.2 million in the UK,54 it 
has so far refused to compensate European owners or buy back the cars.55 
B. EU Auto Regulation: A Broken System 
European emissions tests are governed by the New European Driving Cy-
cle (NEDC).56 Although its name suggests otherwise, the NEDC was devel-
oped in the late 1970s and has not been seriously revised since 1996.57 The 
NEDC puts cars through two cycles; the first lasts approximately thirteen 
                                                                                                                           
The Scandal Explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772 
[https://perma.cc/AR4H-VNQ6]. 
 47 VW Notice of Violation, September 2015, supra note 45. 
 48 Id. Nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions are linked to nitrogen dioxide, ground-level ozone, and 
fine particulate matter. Exposure to these pollutants is associated with asthma attacks and other seri-
ous respiratory illnesses, as well as premature death. Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Hotten, supra note 46. 
 51 Ewing, supra note 7. 
 52 Hotten, supra note 46. VW steadfastly denies that its software is illegal in Europe. Hakim, 
supra note 26. Paul Willis, VW’s head in the United Kingdom, admitted that VW used defeat devices 
in certain models in the United States but maintained he didn’t think “‘it [was] possible to make the 
same definitive legal determination in relation to the software that was fitted’ to ‘differently config-
ured vehicles in the U.K. and the E.U.’” Id. Moreover, in a statement to the New York Times, VW said 
that “‘[t]he Board of Management remains of the opinion’ that the system ‘is not a forbidden defeat 
device.’” Id. 
 53 McGee, supra note 20; Hotten, supra note 46. 
 54 Hotten, supra note 46. 
 55 McGee, supra note 20. In the United States, in contrast, VW has agreed to pay roughly $11 
billion to buy back or fix affected cars—making it one of the largest settlements in a consumer class-
action. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Volkswagen Expected to Pay Another $1 Billion in Emissions Scandal, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/20/business/volkswagen-agrees-to-
buy-back-or-fix-remaining-diesel-cars.html [https://perma.cc/XKU6-TTSK]; Hiroko Tabuchi & Jack 
Ewing, Volkswagen to Pay $14.7 Billion to Settle Diesel Claims in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/business/volkswagen-settlement-diesel-scandal.html [https://
perma.cc/8E72-PNKC]. 
 56 Russell Hotten, Volkswagen Scandal: Are Car Emissions Tests Fit for Purpose?, BBC NEWS 
(Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34340301 [https://perma.cc/KVP8-VQQ2]. 
 57 Id. 
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minutes at an average speed of twelve miles per hour, and the second approxi-
mately seven minutes at an average speed of thirty-nine miles per hour.58 Cars 
endure acceleration and deceleration tests that measure carbon monoxide, NOx, 
particulate matter, and fuel efficiency, among other things.59 Although the 
NEDC is supposed to simulate real-world driving, critics argue that it bears 
little, if any, resemblance to how people actually drive.60 According to Jane 
Thomas of Emissions Analytics, most drivers would not recognize the mild 
acceleration, cruising speed, and braking employed in the tests.61 
Europe’s auto regulatory system has many loopholes.62 Although EU 
rules require tests to take place in controlled laboratory conditions, they do not 
require cars to be fully outfitted during tests.63 For example, automakers may 
test stripped-down preproduction cars known as “golden vehicles” that will 
never be sold.64 It is common for cars to undergo tests before they are 
equipped with backseats or wheels with heavier tread, which increases fuel 
efficiency and reduces emissions.65 Carmakers also may tape car doors and 
grilles to improve aerodynamics, and use “superlubricants” to reduce friction 
in a car’s engine.66 
A major issue with the European system is that automakers pay the very 
companies that certify their cars.67 Some auto industry and environmental ana-
lysts say this commercial relationship allows carmakers to exercise too much 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. VW managing director Paul Willis said of the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC), “It is 
widely recognised, both inside and outside of the industry, that the . . . testing . . . is not fit for purpose 
. . . . Its deficiencies are recognised. There is no simple linear relationship that exists between data 
from NEDC testing and data derived from real world driving.” Alan Tovey, Inquiry Into ‘Not Fit for 
Purpose’ Testing System After VW Emissions Scandal, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 16, 2015, 5:16 PM), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/11999303/Inquiry-into-not-fit-for-purpose-
testing-system-after-VW-emissions-scandal.html [https://perma.cc/ZCM5-WQWT]. 
 61 See Hotten, supra note 56. 
 62 Hakim & Barthelemy, supra note 1. 
 63 Jason Chow et al., Europe’s Auto Makers Keep Test Firms Close, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2015, 
5:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-auto-makers-keep-test-firms-close-1443648097 
[https://perma.cc/6R39-H78M]. 
 64 Id. Golden vehicles frequently lack standard equipment, such as air bags and air conditioning 
units. Id. 
 65 Id.; see also Danny Hakim & Hiroko Tabuchi, Volkswagen Test Rigging Follows a Long 
Auto Industry Pattern, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24/business/
international/volkswagen-test-rigging-follows-a-long-auto-industry-pattern.html [https://perma.cc/
2K7F-KFZ4]. An executive from a leading car manufacturer said European automakers approach 
emissions tests as if they are “preparing for a major race. We tune them and pamper them like stud 
horses.” Chow et al., supra note 63. He also noted that carmakers never randomly select test vehicles 
from the assembly line. Id. 
 66 See Hakim & Tabuchi, supra note 65. Using such superlubricants reduces friction to a degree 
that could not be achieved normally. Id. 
 67 Chow et al., supra note 63. 
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influence over test outcomes.68 The auto industry in Europe also lacks central 
regulatory supervision, as automakers are permitted to have their cars certified 
by regulators in any of the EU’s twenty-eight member states.69 No matter 
where a car is certified, all other member states must recognize the certifica-
tion.70 Countries differ in how they implement EU rules, resulting in test 
standards that are soft and easy to manipulate.71 Moreover, unlike the EPA, the 
EU lacks the authority to perform random spot checks, which help catch 
abuse.72 
The EU’s central government in Brussels and its member states are em-
broiled in a heated battle to reform Europe’s regulatory system.73 Europe plans 
to modify its existing testing regime by requiring cars to undergo road tests in 
addition to laboratory tests, but regulators would still not conduct them.74 The 
proposed road test would continue to permit the use of preproduction vehicles 
and would not feature “cold starts,” which is when most emissions occur.75 
Additionally, the road tests would initially allow carmakers to discharge over 
two times the present European limits on NOx.
76 
C. Emissions Testing in the United States 
The EPA derives its authority to regulate emissions from motor vehicles 
from the Clean Air Act (CAA).77 Unlike in the EU, where carmakers can shop 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Id. Jos Dings, director of the environmental group Transport & Environment, based in Brus-
sels, said, “[t]here is no incentive to be tough on car makers.” Id. This is because the testing firms are 
dependent on the carmakers for business, and the carmakers are free to select which firm does the test. 
See id. Like bond issuers that shop around bond rating agencies for the highest credit rating, carmak-
ers shop around for lenient testing firms. Danny Hakim & Keith Bradsher, After Volkswagen Revela-
tion, Auto Emissions Tests Come Under Global Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/09/25/business/international/volkswagen-emissions-pollution-regulations.html?_
r=0 [https://perma.cc/W6D9-LEHS]. 
 69 See Hakim & Barthelemy, supra note 1. 
 70 Id. Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, a Dutch member of the European Parliament, said of the EU regula-
tory regime, “[w]hat we have developed is a phony system of testing where the member states are in 
competition with each other for who can make it the most easy for the car manufacturers to pass the 
test.” Hakim & Barthelemy, supra note 1. 
 71 Chow et al., supra note 63. 
 72 Id.; see Hakim & Barthelemy, supra note 1. 
 73 Hakim, supra note 26. 
 74 See Danny Hakim & Jad Mouawad, Galvanized by VW Scandal, E.P.A. Expands On-Road 
Emissions Testing, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/business/energy-
environment/epa-expands-on-road-emissions-testing-to-all-diesel-models.html [https://perma.cc/
4NX3-U3DC]. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. The road tests are set to begin in 2017; by 2021, all new cars would be required to emit at 
most fifty percent more than current NOx limits. Id. 
 77 See Summary of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/summary-clean-air-act [https://perma.cc/YUA4-NDTW]. Enacted in 1970, the Clean Air 
Act (CAA) authorized the EPA to create National Ambient Air Quality Standards to protect public 
324 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 40:315 
around member states for certification, automakers in the United States face up 
to three rounds of testing.78 First, car companies conduct their own tests and 
submit their results to the EPA.79 Second, the EPA randomly tests ten to fifteen 
percent of the cars on the production line to verify the carmakers’ results.80 
Approximately three to four percent of new car models face a third level of 
testing: the EPA asks car owners to loan their cars for in-service inspection.81 
The United States’ more robust testing regime helped the EPA detect VW’s 
illegal equipment even though only one percent of cars in America are diesel-
powered.82 In Europe, by contrast, VW’s technology went undetected, despite 
the fact that diesel cars constitute approximately half of the cars on the road.83 
In response to the VW scandal, the EPA has moved away from traditional 
lab tests and extended its on-road emissions tests to cover all types of diesel 
cars.84 Previously, the EPA conducted road testing primarily on large trucks.85 
The technology used for road tests, which resembles a Rube Goldberg machine 
and partly hangs off the back of the car, captures exhaust gases.86 According to 
American regulators, the goal of road tests is to help verify the findings of lab 
tests—not to supplant them—and to catch defeat devices.87 Under the CAA, 
manufacturers are prohibited from manufacturing, selling, or installing defeat 
devices, which render inoperative any device or element of design of the vehi-
cle’s emissions control system.88 
                                                                                                                           
health. Id. When Congress enacted the CAA, California already had its own vehicle emissions caps in 
place. California’s Right to Exceed Federal Auto Emissions Standards Is Upheld, L.A. TIMES (May 2, 
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/02/local/la-me-clean-cars-20110502 [https://perma.cc/
CDC5-54YC]. As a result, California may enact its own stricter standards if it so chooses. Id. 
 78 See Sara Stefanini, VW Scandal Spotlights Lax EU Auto Standards, POLITICO (Sept. 22, 2015, 
9:01 PM), http://www.politico.eu/article/volkswagen-emissions-nox-eu-us-epa-test/ [https://perma.cc/
ZG3A-RDXK]. 
 79 Id. This first round of testing is known as self-certification. Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. The EPA offers the car owner twenty dollars per day and a loaner car in return for the use of 
the car. Hakim & Mouawad, supra note 74. After testing is completed, the EPA returns the car with a 
full tank of gas and an oil change. Id. 
 82 Stefanini, supra note 78. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See Hakim & Mouawad, supra note 74. According to Luke Tonachel, who specializes in auto 
emissions for the Natural Resources Defense Council, “[r]egulators must think more like the cheaters 
. . . . E.P.A is starting to use new tests that can’t be readily gamed by manufacturers.” Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. Lab tests are superior at detecting nitrogen dioxide and other particles and pollutants. 
See id. 
 88 See 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(B) (2012). 
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II. DISCUSSION 
A. Controlling Motor Vehicle Emissions in Europe 
The EU’s air-pollution legislation has evolved over time.89 Early legisla-
tion focused on regulating the sources of pollution, such as cars, and later leg-
islation focused on specific substances, such as lead and sulfur.90 In the 1970s, 
the European Community instituted standards that regulated air pollution from 
motor vehicles and products. 91 Since then, the standards for motor vehicles 
and fuels have been amended many times to create more stringent standards 
and to institute procedures for states to regulate compliance.92 In 1977, an 
amendment set emission caps for NOx.
93 In 1988, emissions standards were 
introduced for particulates.94 Diesel-powered cars have also been regulated 
since the early 1970s, and these regulations have been amended many times 
since.95 
European states have thoroughly debated and negotiated the regulation of 
motor-vehicle pollution.96 Member states such as Germany, which is known 
for its powerful car industry, have sought to subvert the efforts of EU policy 
makers in Brussels by pushing for relaxed emissions standards.97 Germany has 
applied tremendous pressure to other member states, and several central Euro-
pean countries with domestic auto industries have supported its efforts.98 
France, the UK, and Italy, however, have defied Germany’s pressure.99 
                                                                                                                           
 89 See ELLI LOUKA, CONFLICTING INTEGRATION: THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 132 (2004). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 132, 134. 
 93 Commission Directive 77/102/EEC, of 30 November 1976 Adapting to Technical Progress 
Council Directive 70/220/EEC of 20 March 1970 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member 
States Relating to Measures to be Taken Against Air Pollution by Gases from Positive-Ignition En-
gines of Motor Vehicles, 1977 O.J. (L 32) 32, 32–34; LOUKA, supra note 89, at 135. 
 94 Council Directive 88/436/EEC, of 16 June 1988 Amending Directive 70/220/EEC on the Ap-
proximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Measures to Be Taken Against Air Pollu-
tion by Gases from Engines of Motor Vehicles (Restriction of Particulate Pollutant Emissions from 
Diesel Engines), 1988 O.J. (L 214) 1, 1–4; LOUKA, supra note 89, at 135. 
 95 Council Directive 72/306/EEC, of 2 August 1972 on the Approximation of the Laws of the 
Member States Relating to the Measures to Be Taken Against the Emission of Pollutants from Diesel 
Engines for Use in Vehicles, 1972 O.J. (L 190) 889, 889–90; see LOUKA, supra note 89, at 136. 
 96 LOUKA, supra note 89, at 135. 
 97 See Hakim & Barthelemy, supra note 1; Barbara Lewis & Charlie Dunmore, Germany Leans 
on EU States to Weaken Car Emissions Law, REUTERS (June 18, 2013, 1:48 PM), http://uk.reuters.
com/article/us-eu-cars-for-tuesday-idUKBRE95H0J320130618 [https://perma.cc/8ZY9-LMT6]. 
 98 See Lewis & Dunmore, supra note 97. 
 99 See id. 
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Recently, Germany has actively defended its auto industry from pro-
environment proposals widely supported by European nations.100 In a Europe-
an Parliament vote in September 2015, Germany was the only member to op-
pose strengthening emissions standards.101 Even before Dieselgate, members 
of the European Parliament called for emissions tests to be performed under 
real-world driving conditions, rather than in laboratories.102 Many members 
saw the emissions tests then in effect as obsolete.103 Germany, however, op-
posed the European Commission’s proposal to implement real-world emissions 
tests.104 Germany’s resistance has led some members of Parliament to criticize 
the nation as being too subservient to auto-industry lobbyists, including VW 
itself.105 
In February 2016, the European Parliament approved a controversial plan 
to test car emissions under real-world driving conditions, but critics consider the 
plan too soft on the car industry.106 The plan, backed by the EU’s industrial-
policy chief and the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association, allows 
NOx emissions to exceed legal limits by as much as 110% between September 
2017 and January 2020, and by as much as 50% thereafter.107 European Industry 
Commissioner, Elzbieta Bienkowska, promised to review the fifty percent over-
shoot cap and to move to apply the legal limit by 2023.108 The plan’s supporters 
contend that exceeding Europe’s NOx limit by more than 200% is less significant 
than implementing on-road emissions tests.109 But critics argue that the passage 
of the plan represents the European Parliament’s genuflection to the auto-
                                                                                                                           
 100 See Aline Robert, German MEPs Oppose Stricter Car Emissions Tests, EURACTIV (Sept. 25, 
2015), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/transport/german-meps-oppose-stricter-car-emissions-tests-
317981 [https://perma.cc/YBU8-D86B]. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See id. Despite the apparent danger they pose to the environment, some gasses emitted by cars 
are not regulated in Europe. See id. For example, cars may emit an unlimited amount of methane, even 
though its greenhouse effect is twenty-three times stronger than that of carbon dioxide. Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 See id. In response to Germany’s rejection of the proposal, Christine Revault d’Allones 
Bonnefoy, a member of the European Parliament’s Committee on Transport, said, “[i]t really felt like 
we had representatives of Volkswagen among us . . . .” Id. 
 106 Jonathan Stearns, EU’s Controversial Car-Pollution Test Plan Wins Final Approval, BLOOM-
BERG (Feb. 3, 2016, 9:28 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-03/eu-s-controversial-
car-pollution-test-plan-wins-final-approval [https://perma.cc/QL6M-7CBK]. The EU Parliament’s envi-
ronment committee opposed the plan, but failed to collect the minimum 376 votes needed to veto it. Id.  
 107 Id. EU member states approved the plan on October 28, 2015, after rejecting a more stringent 
proposal due to concerns about higher costs for carmakers. Id. The tougher plan would have allowed 
automakers to exceed the EU NOx limit by up to sixty percent for only two years, starting in Septem-
ber 2017. Id. The legal cap would have been enforced starting in September 2019. Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
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industry lobby and an abdication of its responsibility to protect public health.110 
They also allege that too little has been learned from the VW scandal.111 
B. Pollution from Diesel Cars in Europe 
Even before the VW scandal unfolded, European cities faced serious 
problems with air pollution.112 In mid-March 2015, a dense smog containing 
diesel exhaust pollutants covered cities in the UK, France, Spain, Germany, 
Italy, Poland, and Lithuania.113 In response, many EU cities instituted low-
emissions zones to keep environmentally harmful diesel vehicles out of certain 
urban areas.114 Paris attempted to reduce emissions by enacting its first-ever 
“car-free day” on September 27, 2015, prohibiting cars in thirty percent of the 
city between 11:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.115 Milan also banned cars for six hours, 
in December 2015, to alleviate the smog enshrouding Italy’s financial capi-
tal.116 Other European cities have gone to even greater lengths; in 2015, Lon-
don Mayor Boris Johnson supported a national program to pay some drivers to 
get rid of their diesel cars.117 These efforts, however, have been unsuccessful at 
decreasing NOx concentrations thus far.
118 This is because most diesel cars re-
leased before Euro 6, the EU’s latest emissions standards, emitted at least as 
much NOx as previous generations.
119 Jens-Borken Kleefeld, a senior scientist 
at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, predicts that NOx 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 See Schmidt, supra note 10, at A22. 
 113 Id. Parisian air pollution levels were at one point the worst in the world, even topping those in 
Beijing and Delhi. Id. 
 114 Id. In Germany, for example, a driver’s ability to enter into any of the country’s more than 
seventy low-emission zones is dictated by the color of a sticker on the windshield. Id. Older vehicles 
are given red stickers, whereas newer, cleaner vehicles are given yellow and green ones. Id. 
 115 Id.; see also Willsher, supra note 10 (noting that the mayor of Paris is planning more car-free 
days in the city). 
 116 See Colleen Barry, Bicyclists Have Free Rein as Milan Bans Private Cars, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Dec. 28, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/b00b58679afb4e3e85751c5cde165417/
bicyclists-have-free-rein-milan-bans-private-cars [https://perma.cc/283U-8UA6]. 
 117 See Taras Grescoe, The Dirty Truth About ‘Clean Diesel,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/01/03/opinion/sunday/the-dirty-truth-about-clean-diesel.html [https://perma.
cc/83BY-84BV]. 
 118 Schmidt, supra note 10, at A22. 
 119 Id. The EU enacted its first set of emission standards, Euro 1, in July 1992. Chris Ebbs & 
Martin Saarinen, Euro 6 Emissions Standards: What do They Mean for You?, AUTO EXPRESS (Nov. 
13, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://www.autoexpress.co.uk/car-news/consumer-news/90816/euro-6-emissions-
standards-what-do-they-mean-for-you [https://perma.cc/W23W-NW4H]. Since then, EU emissions 
standards have been revised five times, most recently in September 2014 (Euro 6). See id. The Euro 6 
regulations set different limits for petrol and diesel cars. Id. For diesel cars, Euro 6 sets a more strin-
gent cap on NOx emissions than Euro 5—eighty milligrams per kilometer compared to 180 milligrams 
per kilometer. Id. The cap on NOx emissions from petrol cars, however, is the same as it was under 
Euro 5 (sixty milligrams per kilometer). Id. 
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levels will decrease only when new diesel cars with much lower emissions be-
come pervasive or when gasoline-powered cars outnumber diesel ones.120 
C. Regulation of Defeat Devices in Europe 
A defeat device is equipment that reduces the effectiveness of a car’s 
emissions control system when consumers drive, but not when the car is test-
ed.121 It makes a car seem more eco-friendly during emissions testing than it is 
during everyday use.122 Council Regulation 715/2007 defines a defeat device 
as: 
any element of design which senses temperature, vehicle speed, en-
gine speed (RPM), transmission gear, manifold vacuum or any other 
parameter for the purpose of activating, modulating, delaying or de-
activating the operation of any part of the emission control system, 
that reduces the effectiveness of the emission control system under 
conditions which may reasonably be expected to be encountered in 
normal vehicle operation and use.123  
EU law prohibits the use of defeat devices.124 Such devices are not pro-
hibited, however, in certain limited circumstances.125Although defeat devices 
are banned in Europe, European regulations state that when testing emissions, 
“[t]he settings of the engine and of the vehicle’s controls shall be those pre-
scribed by the manufacturer.”126 This requirement also applies “to the settings 
for idling . . . for the cold start device and for the exhaust gas cleaning sys-
tem.”127 By allowing carmakers to determine the settings of their cars’ engines 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Schmidt, supra note 10, at A22. 
 121 See Council Regulation 715/2007, supra note 30, at 5–6; Gates et al., supra note 8. VW’s 
“software sensed when the car was being tested and then activated equipment that reduced emis-
sions. . . . But the software turned the equipment off during regular driving, increasing emissions far 
above legal limits.” Gates et al., supra note 8. 
 122 See Gates et al., supra note 8. 
 123 Council Regulation 715/2007, supra note 30, at 5. 
 124 Id. at 6. The regulation provides: “The use of defeat devices that reduce the effectiveness of 
emission control systems shall be prohibited.” Id. 
 125 See id. The prohibition shall not apply where: 
(a) the need for the device is justified in terms of protecting the engine against damage 
or accident and for the safe operation of the vehicle; 
(b) the device does not function beyond the requirements of the engine starting; or 
(c) the conditions are substantially included in the test procedures for verifying evapo-
rative emissions and average tailpipe emissions. 
Id. 
 126 Regulation No 83, supra note 29, at 80. This regulation “establishes technical requirements for 
the type approval of motor vehicles” and “lays down rules for in-service conformity, durability of 
pollution control devices and On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) systems.” Id. at 2. 
 127 Id. at 80. 
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during emissions tests, this provision seemingly undercuts the EU’s ban on 
defeat devices.128 
D. Controlling Emissions in the United States: Statutory  
and Regulatory Background 
Title II of the CAA and regulations promulgated thereunder seek to pro-
tect the environment and human health by lowering emissions of NOx and oth-
er pollutants from motor vehicles.129 Section 202(a) of the CAA requires the 
EPA to prescribe emissions standards for any pollutant discharged from new 
motor vehicles that it deems deleterious to public health.130 The EPA conducts 
a certification program to ensure that all motor vehicles introduced in the Unit-
ed States comply with the emissions standards.131 As part of the program, the 
EPA issues certificates of conformity to demonstrate that vehicles meet these 
standards.132 Under Section 203(a)(1) of the CAA, automakers may not sell or 
introduce into commerce any new car or car engine unless a certificate of con-
formity covers the car or engine.133 Additionally, a person may not import or 
cause another to import any new car or car engine into the United States unless 
the EPA has issued a certificate of conformity covering the car or engine.134 
Certificates of conformity are issued if a vehicle or engine conforms to 
the emissions regulations prescribed under 42 U.S.C. § 7521.135 To obtain a 
certificate, carmakers must send an application to the EPA for each engine 
family and model year that they will sell in the United States.136 Every applica-
tion must list all auxiliary emission control devices (AECDs) installed in the 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See id.; Council Regulation 715/2007, supra note 30, at 6; see also Hakim & Barthelemy, 
supra note 1. 
 129 Complaint at 8, U.S. v. Volkswagen AG, No. 2:16-CV-10006 (E.D. Mich. filed Jan. 4, 2016); 
see 42 U.S.C §§ 7521–7554 (2012). NOx is a major contributor to the atmospheric reactions that pro-
duce ozone. Complaint, supra. Breathing ozone can lead to many health problems, including chest 
pain and coughing, and can exacerbate bronchitis and asthma. Id. Children are the most vulnerable to 
suffering from exposure to ozone. Id. 
 130 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (concluding 
that section 202(a)(1) of CAA authorizes EPA to regulate emissions from new motor vehicles if it 
forms a “judgment” that such emissions contribute to climate change). 
 131 Complaint, supra note 129; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1). 
 132 Complaint, supra note 129, at 8–9; Penalty for Noncompliant Engines Upheld, AIR POLLU-
TION CONSULTANT, 2015, at 3.10, 3.10; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1). 
 133 Penalty for Noncompliant Engines Upheld, supra note 132; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1). 
 134 Penalty for Noncompliant Engines Upheld, supra note 132; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1). 
 135 See Complaint, supra note 129; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1) (“The Administrator shall 
test, or require to be tested in such a manner as he deems appropriate, any new motor vehicle engine 
submitted by a manufacturer to determine whether such vehicle or engine conforms with the regula-
tions prescribed under section 7521 of this title.”). 
 136 Penalty for Noncompliant Engines Upheld, supra note 132. The application must identify the 
engine family, characterize the vehicles and their emissions-control system, include emissions test 
results, and describe all adjustable parameters. Id. 
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vehicle.137 An AECD is “any element of design which senses temperature, ve-
hicle speed, engine RPM, transmission gear, manifold vacuum, or any other 
parameter for the purpose of activating, modulating, delaying, or deactivating 
the operation of any part of the emission control system.”138 In the list, the 
manufacturer must justify each AECD—doing so in detail for those that reduce 
the effectiveness of the emissions control system; describe the parameters it 
senses and controls; and explain why the AECDs are not defeat devices.139 
E. Regulation of Defeat Devices in the United States 
The use of defeat devices is banned in the United States.140 Federal regu-
lations define a defeat device as “an auxiliary emission control device (AECD) 
that reduces the effectiveness of the emission control system under conditions 
which may reasonably be expected to be encountered in normal vehicle opera-
tion and use.”141 Like EU law, U.S. federal law exempts from defeat-device 
status any device that protects the vehicle from damage or accident, or that 
does not function after the engine has started.142 The U.S. definition of “defeat 
device” mirrors the EU definition in that it does not apply if the emissions-test 
conditions reflect those one would expect to find in everyday driving.143 Sec-
tion 203(a)(3)(A) of the CAA prohibits any person from removing or rendering 
ineffective any device or element of design installed in a car in compliance 
with regulations under Title II of the CAA both before and after it is sold and 
delivered to the ultimate purchaser.144 Additionally, section 203(a)(3)(B) of the 
CAA bars anyone from knowingly manufacturing, selling, or offering for sale 
a defeat device.145 
                                                                                                                           
 137 Complaint, supra note 129, at 9; see also 40 C.F.R. § 86.1844-01(d)(11) (2015). 
 138 40 C.F.R. § 86.1803-01 (2015) (“[An] [e]lement of design means any control system (i.e., 
computer software, electronic control system, emission control system, computer logic), and/or con-
trol system calibrations, and/or the results of systems interaction, and/or hardware items on a motor 
vehicle or motor vehicle engine.”). 
 139 Id. § 86.1844-01(d)(11). 
 140 See Complaint, supra note 129, at 10; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(A)-(B); 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 86.1809-01, -10, -12 (2015). 
 141 40 C.F.R. § 86.004-2. 
 142 Id.; see Council Regulation 715/2007, supra note 30, at 6. 
 143 40 C.F.R. § 86.004-2; see Council Regulation 715/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 171), supra note 30, at 
6. Unlike EU law, U.S. law includes a fourth exemption from defeat-device status if: 
[t]he AECD applies only for engines that will be installed in emergency vehicles, and 
the need is justified in terms of preventing the engine from losing speed, torque, or 
power due [sic] abnormal conditions of the emission control system, or in terms of pre-
venting such abnormal conditions from occurring, during operation related to emergen-
cy response. 
40 C.F.R. § 86.004-2; see Council Regulation 715/2007, supra note 30, at 6. 
 144 Complaint, supra note 129, at 11; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(A). 
 145 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(B); see 40 C.F.R. § 86-004-2. 
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Federal regulations provide that the EPA Administrator may test any ve-
hicle using driving cycles and conditions “that may reasonably be expected to 
be encountered in normal operation and use, for the purposes of investigating a 
potential defeat device.”146 When tested, carmakers must demonstrate to the 
Administrator that the vehicle design “does not incorporate strategies that un-
necessarily reduce emission control effectiveness exhibited during the Federal 
Test Procedure or Supplemental Federal Test Procedure (FTP or SFTP) when 
the vehicle is operated under conditions that may reasonably be expected to be 
encountered in normal operation and use.”147 If the Administrator makes a re-
quest, the carmaker is required to explain in detail any devices, design features, 
or algorithms it uses both during and outside the federal emissions test.148 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. VW’s Emissions Deception Is Illegal Under EU Law 
The software VW installed in its European cars qualifies as a defeat de-
vice under EU law.149 VW has admitted to using illegal software to cheat emis-
sions tests in the United States but denies that it broke European rules.150 Nev-
ertheless, the EU’s and the United States’ respective bans on defeat devices prac-
                                                                                                                           
 146 40 C.F.R. § 86.1809-10(b). This regulation applies to light-duty vehicles, medium-duty pas-
senger vehicles, and heavy-duty vehicles. Id. Light-duty vehicles are “passenger cars and light trucks: 
minivans, passenger vans, pickup trucks, and sport-utility vehicles.” Emissions Standards Reference 
Guide for On-Road and Nonroad Vehicles and Engines, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/emission-standards-reference-guide/learn-about-emission-standards-reference-guide-
road-and-nonroad [https://perma.cc/T3R2-SLHZ]. Heavy-duty vehicles are “heavy trucks and buses: 
large pick-ups, delivery trucks, recreational vehicles (RVs), and semi trucks.” Id. 
 147 40 C.F.R. § 86.1809-10(d)(1). The Federal Test Procedure (FTP) is a “low-speed city cycle.” 
Csaba Csere, These Tests Failed You: Why Is the EPA So Bad at Estimating Hybrid Fuel Economy?, 
CAR & DRIVER (May 2013), http://www.caranddriver.com/features/why-is-the-epa-so-bad-at-
estimating-hybrid-fuel-economy-feature [https://perma.cc/B7XG-C6G6]. It is conducted in a laborato-
ry at seventy-five degrees Fahrenheit after the car has rested for at least twelve hours. Id. Using lim-
ited accelerations and decelerations, the test runs for forty-one minutes and has a maximum speed of 
fifty-seven miles per hour. Id. The Supplemental FTP is a high-acceleration, aggressive driving 
schedule designed to more accurately assess real-world emissions. COMM. ON OZONE-FORMING PO-
TENTIAL & REFORMULATED GASOLINE ET AL., OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL OF REFORMULATED 
GASOLINE 90 (1999). 
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tically mirror each other,151 and VW equipped its cars in Europe with the very 
software that regulators say cheated emissions tests in the United States.152 
Generally speaking, EU law defines a defeat device as a feature of a car 
that “reduces the effectiveness of the emissions control system” during normal 
driving conditions.153 VW installed software in each car’s electronic control 
module that caused the cars to perform far better during emissions tests than 
during everyday use.154 When the software sensed the car had begun an emis-
sions test, it told the car to activate a low NOx temperature-conditioning 
mode.155 This mode adjusted the engine so that it emitted low levels of NOx 
and elevated exhaust temperatures.156 The high exhaust temperatures heated 
the selective catalytic reduction system, which enhanced the system’s capabil-
ity to lower NOx emissions.
157 When a timer detected the end of the test proce-
dure, the software told the vehicle to end low NOx temperature conditioning 
and to transition into “normal mode.”158 In “normal mode,” the emission con-
trol system instantly became less effective, permitting NOx tailpipe emissions 
well above the legal limit.159 Therefore, VW’s software was an element of de-
sign that sensed whether a car was being tested in order to reduce the effec-
tiveness of the emissions control system during normal driving conditions.160 It 
thus qualifies as a defeat device under EU law.161 
Even though the regulation that European regulators left in place allows 
carmakers to change the performance settings of their engines before a pollution 
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test, VW’s trickery is illegal in Europe because VW equipped its cars with illegal 
defeat devices.162 None of the exceptions to the EU’s prohibition of defeat de-
vices apply to VW’s software.163 Regulation No 83, which provides “the settings 
of the engine and of the vehicle’s controls shall be those prescribed by the manu-
facturer,” is not an escape hatch for European automakers.164 The engine settings 
that a carmaker prescribes for a pollution test have no bearing on whether a car 
uses a device that decreases the efficacy of the emissions control system during 
normal driving conditions.165 VW’s software undeniably reduced the effective-
ness of its cars’ emissions control systems during everyday driving.166 Conse-
quently, VW’s emissions test cheating is illegal under EU law.167 
B. The Consequences of Deeming VW’s Trickery Legal in Europe 
1. Deepening the Divide Between European and American Auto 
Regulations 
The United States and Europe have remarkably different systems of auto 
regulation, in terms of both the substance and administration of their respective 
laws.168 The VW scandal has put Europe’s lax testing practices in the spotlight, 
and the investigation has revealed fundamental disparities in American and 
European regulations.169 In Europe, automakers may have their vehicles’ emis-
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sions certified by regulators in any of the twenty-eight member states, and all 
other member states must accept the certification.170 European automakers pay 
private firms to certify their cars, and they test stripped-down preproduction 
vehicles that bear little resemblance to the vehicles they sell to consumers.171 
The United States, by contrast, has a substantially more robust testing regime, 
under which carmakers face up to three rounds of testing.172 Car manufacturers 
send their own test results to the EPA, the EPA tests cars randomly chosen 
from the production line, and sometimes the EPA borrows cars from consum-
ers to test them.173 
This regulatory disparity increases production costs, motivates price dis-
crimination across markets, and restricts available imports.174 Divergent auto 
regulations are costly for the economy.175 Because carmakers such as Ford and 
BMW sell their vehicles worldwide, they must produce different models in 
Europe and the United States to comply with domestic safety and environmen-
tal laws.176 This increases the costs of production and reduces consumer 
choice, as producing models demanded by small markets becomes unprofita-
ble.177 Thus, countries on both sides of the Atlantic stand to gain from coordi-
nating their auto regulations.178 
As the VW scandal has unfolded, European and American negotiators 
have worked on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a 
trade deal that seeks to coordinate regulations across the EU and the United 
States.179 The TTIP’s aims include removing tariffs on imported cars and har-
monizing U.S. and European safety and environmental standards for motor 
vehicles.180 If adopted, the agreement could expand trade by at least twenty 
percent, increase manufacturing by European brands in the United States, and 
prompt American carmakers to sell a broader lineup of models.181 Expanding 
trade between the United States and the EU could spur economic growth and 
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job creation on both continents.182 In fact, according to a recent research paper 
from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, harmonizing U.S. and 
EU auto regulations could boost the combined national incomes of both part-
ners by more than $20 billion per year going forward.183 
But if VW is able to avoid liability in Europe, this could severely de-
crease the EU’s bargaining power in its negotiations with the United States and 
make it harder to agree on uniform auto regulations in the TTIP.184 The revela-
tion that VW equipped some eleven million cars worldwide with illegal soft-
ware will likely undermine the credibility of the EU.185 The news has stunned 
consumers, investors, and average citizens alike and has revealed the deep-
rooted flaws in the EU regulatory system.186 It has become clear that experts 
and regulators, including the European Commission itself, not only knew that 
on-road emissions greatly exceeded emissions measured during laboratory 
tests but also that some cars were equipped with defeat devices.187 Without the 
American regulatory system, VW’s rampant pollution might have continued 
unchecked.188 Europeans typically criticize American regulators for being un-
mindful of environmental and public-health concerns, but they can no longer 
claim the moral high ground.189 Because European regulators turned a blind 
eye to VW as it cheated, deeming VW’s trickery legal after the fact would un-
dermine what little remaining credibility the EU has.190 Moreover, such a rul-
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ing would likely decrease European negotiators’ bargaining power, making it 
harder to reach an agreement on the TTIP any time soon.191 
2. Environmental and Public Health Costs 
Urban air in Europe poses a serious threat to public health, and diesel cars 
are the main culprit.192 According to World Health Organization guidelines, 
more than eighty percent of the EU urban population experiences dangerous 
levels of air pollution.193 Exposure to such pollution can have fatal conse-
quences.194 Urban NOx exposure contributed to an estimated 75,000 premature 
deaths in Europe in 2012.195 Diesel exhaust is full of soot particles that allow 
carcinogens to sink themselves into tissues and organs.196 Diesel cars are a 
principal source of pollution because they are pervasive and spew their emis-
sions close to where people live.197 The devastating pollution in Europe is oc-
curring in spite of the EU’s wide-ranging laws that restrict ambient air-
pollution levels, total national emissions, and emissions from vehicles.198 The 
cause of Europe’s polluted air is the EU’s toothless system of emissions regu-
lation, which enables cars to demonstrate low levels of pollution during labora-
tory tests yet emit sky-high levels on the road.199 
The VW scandal has exacerbated Europe’s emissions crisis and caused 
tremendous harm to public health.200 VW’s rigged cars may be responsible for 
almost one million tons of air pollution every year.201 In a recent study, a team 
of researchers from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard 
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University estimated that the excess emissions from VW’s cheating contribut-
ed to approximately fifty-nine deaths in the United States between 2008 and 
2015.202 The study concluded that the monetized cost of these emissions was 
approximately $450 million.203 Additionally, the researchers estimated that 
bringing VW’s rigged vehicles into compliance by the end of 2016 would pre-
vent approximately 130 deaths and avoid approximately $840 million in social 
costs in the United States.204 Although these numbers are jarring, the number 
of fatalities and financial costs attributable to the scandal are likely substantial-
ly higher in Europe, where consumers used VW’s affected cars much more 
widely.205 
Failing to hold VW liable for cheating European emissions tests would be 
a major step backward in Europe’s efforts to protect the environment and pub-
lic health.206 It could send the message to other European carmakers that they 
may pollute in the EU with impunity.207 This could wreak immense damage on 
the economy, the planet, and human lives.208 
3. Stymying Thousands of Consumer Claims Against VW 
The biggest financial threat that VW faces in Europe is private litiga-
tion.209 But due to European laws that protect corporations from class-action 
lawsuits brought by consumers, VW owners face a tall task.210 In response, 
lawyers in cities such as Berlin and Paris are joining forces with new online 
businesses that seek to circumvent the obstacles to class-action suits by assum-
ing the claims of aggrieved car owners en masse.211 The startups are consid-
ered collection agencies, as opposed to law firms, and may therefore work on 
commission, meaning they are paid only if their efforts to collect are success-
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ful.212 Investors often fund the legal expenses in exchange for a promised piece 
of the eventual judgment.213 In essence, the companies enable quasi-class ac-
tions.214 If the businesses are successful, the cost to VW will likely be breath-
taking, given that the carmaker’s settlement in the United States was nearly 
$15 billion.215 
It is unlikely that VW will receive any substantial fine from the EU.216 
Despite the fact that 8.5 million of VW’s eleven million rigged cars are in Eu-
rope, no European nation has yet penalized the carmaker.217 One reason for 
this is that although EU law bans defeat devices, there are no defined penalties 
for using them.218 In contrast, U.S. law requires automakers to identify, de-
scribe, and justify any emissions control device.219 As a result, the U.S. gov-
ernment can prosecute carmakers for omission or wrongful declaration, ex-
panding the reach of punitive action.220 Second, EU states are loath to penalize 
beleaguered companies, especially ones that embody vital national interests.221 
There is a tacit EU rule that certain national interests are sacrosanct, and Ger-
many’s auto industry historically has been considered one of them.222 Third, 
even if the European Commission desired to sanction VW, it would likely be 
unable to because it can directly fine companies only on trade and competition 
issues.223 
Failing to hold VW liable under EU law for its use of defeat devices 
could stifle European consumers’ claims against the carmaker.224 With the Eu-
ropean Commission unlikely to impose financial sanctions on VW, private liti-
gation is probably the best means of holding the company accountable for its 
emissions cheating in Europe.225 
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C. How to Improve the EU’s Auto Regulatory System 
The VW scandal has revealed the inherent weaknesses of the EU regula-
tory system.226 It has highlighted a regime lacking central oversight, closely 
tied to private testing firms, full of loopholes, and heavily influenced by the 
bloc’s largest carmakers.227 Years before news of Dieselgate broke, the Euro-
pean Commission already knew that the German carmaker’s diesel cars ex-
ceeded pollution limits.228 It also knew that other cars in the industry had simi-
lar emissions problems.229 In order for the EU to prevent similar scandals in 
the future, it should make significant changes to its current regulatory sys-
tem.230 
First, the EU should institute a central regulator analogous to the EPA.231 
There is no independent authority that oversees car testing throughout the 
EU.232 Instead, there is a hodgepodge of twenty-eight national agencies with 
inconsistent standards.233 As a result, carmakers may have their vehicles’ emis-
sions certified by regulators in any of the bloc’s member states, and then all 
other member states must recognize the certification.234 The EPA, in contrast, 
certifies all cars in the United States to ensure they comply with emissions 
standards.235 The EU’s regulatory system is problematic because it results in 
varying standards from state to state, which enables automakers to target the 
national regulators with the softest standards.236 
Second, the EU should attain greater independence from private testing 
firms.237 Unlike in the United States, car manufacturers in Europe hire outside 
contractors to certify their emissions controls.238 This setup is dangerous be-
cause it creates a commercial dependence between the testing companies and 
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the manufacturers.239 Such financial reliance may incentivize rule-breaking, as 
testing firms are motivated to approve rigged vehicles to attract more busi-
ness.240 Europe should emulate the testing regime in the United States, where 
the EPA completes up to three rounds of testing, including reviewing automak-
ers’ self-certification and performing random checks of its own.241 This would 
help eliminate the current incentive to cheat emissions tests for profit and re-
store confidence in the testing system.242 
Third, the EU should eliminate the loopholes that undermine its emis-
sions-testing regime.243 These loopholes allow car manufacturers to remove the 
back seats from their cars to make them lighter, tape the doors and grilles to 
make them more aerodynamic, and even examine preproduction cars unfit for 
commerce.244 In a February 2016 vote, members of the European Parliament 
failed to close loopholes in emissions caps on new diesel cars.245 Despite con-
cern about the high levels of pollution in European cities, NOx emissions may 
now exceed legal limits by as much as 110% between September 2017 and 
January 2020, and by as much as 50% thereafter.246 To remove these loop-
holes, regulators will have to stand up against the car-industry lobby, which 
exerts an outsized influence on auto regulation.247 
Fourth, the EU should hold Europe’s powerful car companies accountable 
by passing legislation that empowers it to penalize automakers for using defeat 
devices.248 The EU’s reluctance to punish companies that represent important 
national interests shields carmakers from the financial penalties they de-
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serve.249 The EU should model its legislation after U.S. law, which requires car 
manufacturers to identify and describe any emissions control devices in their 
cars during the certification process.250 Doing so would allow the EU to sanc-
tion carmakers not only for using defeat devices but also for lying about their 
existence, thereby augmenting the Union’s punitive power.251 
CONCLUSION 
The VW emissions scandal is one of the most alarming and costly corpo-
rate scandals in history. For nearly a decade, one of the foremost carmakers 
fooled the world, rigging its vehicles so that they performed soundly during 
emissions tests but polluted recklessly in everyday use. Perhaps the most 
shocking aspect of the scandal is that nobody in Europe took action to stem its 
tide, despite red flags. Dieselgate has exposed not only the shocking malfea-
sance of VW’s top executives but also the profound deficiencies in the EU’s 
auto regulatory system. Exploiting these flaws and its political clout, VW 
caused enormous damage to the environment, public health, the economy, its 
consumers, and, ultimately, itself. To improve its regulatory framework, the 
EU should create a central regulatory body similar to the EPA, cut ties between 
carmakers and private testing firms, eliminate systemic loopholes, and penalize 
automakers for using defeat devices. The EU has the power to hold VW ac-
countable for its deception and to send a strong message to all carmakers that 
they cannot pollute in Europe without consequence. Europe has turned a blind 
eye to the car industry for too long; if it does not hold VW liable or fix its 
regulatory system soon, history will likely repeat itself. 
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